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BOOK REVIEWS
BUREAUCRACY vs. ENVIRONMENT:
THE ENVIRONMENTAL COST OF
BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE
JOHN BADEN and RICHARD L. STROUP, editors.

Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 1981. Pp. 238.

From one point of view this book may be regarded as a variation
on the theme sounded by Garrett Hardin in his seminal essay "The
Tragedy of the Commons." (Science, 1968). From another viewpoint it may be regarded as a contribution to public choice theory of
political economy. But this would be an oversimplified perspective
because each of the thirteen chapters which comprise this book represents a distinctive analysis by different authors of problems involved in governmental management of natural resources. Four of
the thirteen essays are coauthored, including one by the editors of
the volume. Several essays are substantially case studies-some, it is
to be hoped, of past practices now abandoned. Among them are accounts of clearing land by "chaining" practiced by the BLM and the
Forest Service, grazing policies on BLM lands and the Navajo Reservation, clear cutting practices in the Forest Service, and policies regarding the development of coal and natural gas reserves.
Although I have described this volume as a variation upon the
"tragedy of the commons theme" the variation is as important as the

theme and, being a variation, is somewhat different. The connection
with the commons may not be readily apparent inasmuch as these
essays deal with governmental bureaucracy which presumably provides an antidote to the pathology of the commons. But, as Rodney
D. Fort and John Baden point out in the initial essay, the United
States Treasury has come to be treated as a common pool resource
which may be described generically as a kind of "commons."
I do not read the essays as advancing a libertarian view that the
role of government in the management of natural resources has been
wholly ineffective or destructive. As the authors observe, "an imperfection in collective management should not automatically cause us
to avoid governmental action." The question is: what kind of governmental action, and subject to what responsibilities and controls? In
an introduction, editors Baden and Stroup develop the proposition
that unifies this volume. They are, they say, "increasingly convinced
that both the environmental and economic costs of bureaucratic management of natural resources are excessively and unnecessarily high.
These social costs are generated by perverse institutional structures
that give authority to those who do not bear responsibility for the
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consequences of their actions." Regarding the usefulness of the book,
the editors state their belief that "the primary social value of this collection will be its contribution toward explicating the costs, especially
the environmental costs of bureaucrats holding authority that is buffered from responsibility."
The editors develop this thesis more explicitly when they declare:
The root cause of failure in the collective arena is the same as in
the private: authority and responsibility are separated. In the private
sector, this occurs when property rights are not clearly established or
enforcible so that, for example, the smelter owner uses the air resource for free garbage (SO2 ) and is not held responsible. He captures benefits but not costs. Similarly-but much more frequentlyin the public sector, the individual with the authority to order an
action does not bear certain important costs of that action.
In a mass democracy the average citizen will have little time or
reason to familiarize himself with the policies and procedures of the
big resource management agencies. But these agencies will be studied
attentively by those interests with which they are directly and unavoidably involved-lumbering, grazing, mining, outdoor recreation,
and wilderness preservation, among others. And as with all bureaucracies, public or private, the resource management agencies have survival interests that have demonstrably influenced their policies and
actions over time. The collective essays document numerous cases of
bureaucratic self-interest overriding broader economic and environmental considerations. If long range public interests and economic
efficiency had been paramount in public policymaking it is at least
open to question whether vast public works extravaganzas such as
the Garrison Diverson project in North Dakota, or the TennesseeTombigbee waterway in Mississippi and Alabama, would ever have
been undertaken. Neither of these controversial public works is dealt
with in this set of essays, but the generalization the editors draw with
respect to the cases considered would also equally apply. They conclude that "most, if not all, of the environmentally destructive practices discussed . . . would not occur if the agency were required to

meet the standards of economic efficiency."
The essay by Bernard Shanks entitled "Dams and Disasters: The
Social Problems of Water Development Policies," does a good job of
summarizing the consequences of building dams of dubious economic
utility. His indictment of the Garrison Dam relates primarily to the
costs directly attributable to the impoundment itself. But another
essay could have been written about the subsequent cost growing out
of the efforts of the Bureau of Reclamation to compensate for the
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losses of agricultural lands buried under the waters impounded by
Garrison through a diversion project which has been a major source
of controversy in North Dakota, and in which Canada is also involved.
Thus I do not believe the authors of these essays can be faulted with
overstating their cases.
A concluding essay by M. Bruce Johnson, entitled "The Environmental Costs of Bureaucratic Government: Theories and Cases,"
summarizes the principal points in the preceding essays and draws
some general conclusions from their findings. Principal among these
is the need to "price" realistically the cost of public enterprise in relation to natural resources and environment. Thus this volume ends
upon a note of principle rather than with a universal prescription for
dealing with the fundamental problem of identifying and allocating
the true costs and benefits of natural resources management. In the
course of a two year study of the administration of the National Environmental Policy Act in federal natural resource management agencies, I have become persuaded that the federal bureaucracy is today
doing a more responsible and farsighted job of management in relation to natural resources and the environment than was done formerly
or as described in most essays in this volume. Nevertheless, as Congressional action in public works and natural resources policy continues to demonstrate, major political and institutional barriers to
rational resource management persist. Responsibility in bureaucracy
is not likely to be increased without a corresponding increase in responsible behavior by Congressmen. Perhaps an item veto for the President would be an effective inducer of Congressional responsibility.
This volume is timely and its arguments persuasive, certainly to the
extent that a careful examination of the consequences of the ways in
which resource management and public works decisions are made
continues to justify attention. I would very much like to see a comparable volume dealing with the issue of public decisionmaking and
responsibility in the Federal courts. It may be possible to structure
bureaucracy to make it institutionally responsible for its behavior,
but I share with Thomas Jefferson deep doubt that our most irresponsible branch of government, the judiciary, can be made responsible
for the consequences of its decisions without a major reordering of
our constitutional system.
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